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I 

The dictionary tells you that a shadow is a dark area or volume caused by an opaque 
object blocking some light. The definition is correct, but we need to clarify a couple of its 
elements: darkness and blocking.  
 Regarding darkness we should note two things. One is that a shadow does not 
need to be pure darkness; depending on the circumstances, a shadow can be darker or 
lighter in absolute terms. The second thing to note is that a shadow to exist at a certain 
location does not always require a contrast with lighter areas surrounding it. Such a 
contrast is required in order to see a shadow, but not for the shadow to exist as such. To 
illustrate this point, consider the shadow cast by a box on a white wall. Suppose we 
painted the area on the wall surrounding the shadow in a color that exactly matches the 
darkness of the shadow. Did we render the shadow invisible? Yes, it is not visually 
identifiable. But did we annihilate it? I would say we did not. As far as ontology goes, the 
cast shadow is simply the absence of light on a certain surface as a result of its being 
blocked by an opaque object, or, in other words, as a result of an opaque object standing 
between the light source and the surface.  
 In Aranyosi 2007, I accounted for the location of shadows in terms of where light 
would have been, had it not been blocked. Now I realize that the phrase "light would 
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have been at location S" is ambiguous in a way that makes the difference between cases 
when an opaque object blocks light such that we do have a shadow cast on a surface and 
those when we don't have a shadow even if there is a blocker. When giving an account of 
shadows, the phrase should really mean "light would have been reflected at location S", 
rather than merely "light would have hit at location S". The reason is that an object 
cannot cast a shadow on a completely black surface, that is, a surface that does not reflect 
any wavelength of light. The darkness of the surface is not the effect of the object 
blocking some light, because had the blocker been removed, the surface would have been 
as dark as before. Compare now with our previous case—that of darkening the area 
around the shadow cast on the white wall. If the blocker had been removed, there would 
have been light reflected by the white wall. This is what it means for a shadow to exist at 
a location. 
 Let us now turn from ontology to perception. What does it mean to see a shadow? 
If the existence of a shadow at S means that light would be reflected (or reflected to a 
higher extent) by the surface at S, were it not blocked, then seeing a shadow at S appears 
to mean either seeing that at S light would be reflected, were it not blocked, or seeing the 
light that would be reflected at S, were it not blocked. Both are problematic.  
The first is an instance of what Dretske (1969) calls "epistemic seeing", or “seeing 
that”, and it is implausible as an analysis of seeing a shadow, because it requires too 
much. We can sometimes see a shadow without being aware that it is a shadow, and, 
more generally, seeing a shadow does not require that one knows or believes that it is the 
result of some object blocking light. The second interpretation is an instance of seeing as 
such, or nonepistemic seeing, and, although it is definitely more plausible than seeing 
that, it has its own problem in our case. When we see a shadow at S, it is not the light 
that, counterfactually, would be there, were it not blocked, that we see. We see the 
darkness, the absence of light. On a causal theory of seeing, it is even be hard to make 
sense of a causal connection to a counterfactual cause of our experience, as suggested by 
the phrase "to see the light that would be at S ...". In fact, when our attention is focused 
on a shadow, it is in virtue of not seeing the light that would have been reflected at S that 
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we see the shadow. But if it is grounded in our not seeing the light that otherwise would 
be there, were it not blocked, what is it that we actually see? 


II 

We can sometimes gain insight into what it means to A by raising the question of what it 
means to fail to A. As noted above, one can fail to see a shadow at location S when in fact 
a shadow exists at S. Is it the lack of contrast with the area surrounding S, when the light 
is prevented by a blocker from reaching and being reflected at S, that makes us fail to see 
a shadow? Our case of darkening the area around the shadow on the white wall seems to 
point in that direction, but this is not always the case. The hatchet fish is a bioluminiscent 
ocean dweller emitting light downwards in a way that matches the properties of the 
sunlight from above, which the fish perceives with its eyes. As this feature was selected 
for its camouflaging properties, biologists talk about the hatchet fish as "camouflaging its 
own shadow". But, strictly speaking, the fish annihilates its own shadow; a shadow needs 
to be dark. So here we have a case of light being blocked by an opaque object, that is, 
light that would be reflected by the surface were it not blocked, and a lack of contrast 
generated by the light source on the fish's belly, yet, there is no shadow. So the lack of 
contrast with the surroundings of S is not sufficient to explain failure to see a shadow at S 
even when otherwise there is a blocker of light.  
 Is it, then, the lack of contrast with the surroundings of S and the darkness of the 
surface at S that together explain cases of failing to see the shadow at S? It is, but we 
should dwell a bit into what we mean by "darkness" in this case. We shouldn't imply that 
a shadow is visible only on the condition that it is darker than its surrounding surface. 
Consider again our example with the box casting a shadow on the white wall, and 
suppose we painted the wall around the shadow with pure black. The shadow would 
appear as much lighter than the surrounding area. We would see the shadow even though 
probably we would fail to recognize it as a shadow, if we weren't aware of the setting. We 
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might even think that the box is illuminating the wall, yet, we would actually see its 
shadow.  
 Darkness, therefore, should be understood here as implying a contrast not with the 
reflectance properties of the surface surrounding the shadow, but as a contrast with a 
counterfactual situation involving the surface occupied by the shadow itself. So maybe 
we fail to see a shadow at S when the surface at S is (1) actually visually 
indistinguishable from the surroundings of S and (2) would appear less dark than actually, 
if the light were not blocked. Condition (2) is an existential condition for shadows, stating 
their causally dependent nature, hence, it will have to also be satisfied when we do see a 
shadow. 
At this point one might raise the following case as a potential counterexample to 
the above analysis. Suppose the box casts a shadow on the white wall, and that we paint 
the area surrounding the shadow the same color as the shaded area, so they become 
indistinguishable visually. Suppose that the material surface exactly occupying the area 
on which the shadow is cast is photosensitive, so that it adjusts its level of light 
absorption in such a way as to keep its apparent darkness constant under all illumination 
conditions. So the above counterfactual condition does not hold: were the blocker 
removed, the surface under the shadow would appear exactly as dark as before. If we 
agreed that there was a shadow on the wall before removing the blocker, then this looks 
like a counterexample to my claim about the conditions in which we fail to see a shadow. 
But why should we accept the claim that there is a shadow on the wall in such 
conditions? The cause of why the surface is dark is not exclusively and immediately that 
light is blocked by an opaque object. Its darkness is caused by the intrinsic material 
features of the surface itself. Shadows, on the other hand, are exclusively and 
immediately grounded in causal processes extrinsic to the surface itself. This is not to say 
that the intrinsic properties of the material surface play no role, but that they are to be 
considered background conditions rather than active causes. Being background 
conditions, they are supposed to be kept constant when analyzing a causal connection 
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involving them in terms of counterfactuals. So I don't think this is a counterexample to 
the above analysis. 


III 

 If the above characterization of failing to see a shadow at S is correct, then we see 
a shadow at S when the surface at S is visually distinguishable from the surroundings of 
S, and the surface at that location would reflect more light, were the blocker removed. 
Yet, even this is not sufficient. Consider your hand casting a shadow on the white wall. 
Now move it closer and closer to the wall until it touches its surface. The shadow did not 
disappear at the moment you have touched the wall since it is still true that the surface 
touched by your hand would have reflected more light, had your hand been removed.   1
The visual appearance of the surface of your hand also contrasts with its surroundings, 
namely, the white wall. Yet, you fail to see its shadow. 
 The explanation is that you can't see the surface through your opaque hand, but 
you do sometimes see it through a shadow, except, of course, when the shadow is very 
dark. To see a shadow, as reflected by the discussion so far and assuming a causal 
account of seeing, is to have a visual causal relation to the shaded area, rather than to the 
shadow itself. To see a shadow is to have your visual awareness of a surface modulated 
by the absence of light caused by a blocker, in such a way that a visual contrast with the 
surrounding area is also noticeable. So it is a way of failing to see a surface, or, to be 
more precise, a degree of not seeing a surface as well as in normal conditions of 
!  5
!  Jack Woods and Bill Wringe pointed out to me that this claim appears to entail that there are plenty of 1
(indeed, infinitely many) shadows inside any opaque object that receives some light, because removing any 
proper part of such an object will reveal a surface that reflects more light than before the removal (as it was 
inside the opaque object, the revealed surface failed to reflect any light whatsoever). This would be a rather 
peculiar view to endorse. But, in fact, there is no such entailment. In my analysis I talk about surfaces that 
would have reflected more light, had light not been blocked. By definition, no interior proper part of an 
opaque object counts as a surface. "Surface" is understood to mean outer skin or envelope of an object. See 
Casati and Varzi 1994: ch. 2.
illumination.   The highest such degree is when a shadow is totally dark, for instance, 2
when the blocker is close enough to the surface and the light is very strong. The lowest 
such degree is when you are still able to notice a shadow, as a consequence of its contrast 
with the surrounding (though, again, you might still not be aware that it is a shadow  ). We 3
cross this limit of seeing a shadow when the contrast it creates on the surface is not 
noticeable any longer unless, for example, the blocker moves. Sorensen offers such an 
example based on his personal experience: 

 (...) faint shadows can disappear when they move too little. This first 
came to my attention while marveling at how thoroughly my lawn had 
been cleared of leaves. To my amazement, a leaf seemed to materialize 
on the bare grass and then disappear. It was actually the shadow of a leaf 
in a tree. The shadow was too faint to see when stationary but became 
visible when a breeze moved the leaf. Although the leaf shadow did this 
repeatedly, I was unable to break the camouflage of the shadow. (2008: 
85) 

The idea that seeing a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface is not crazy. The 
animal world offers indirect support for it through the phenomenon of countershading, 
the most common body surface pigmentation phenotype in the animal kingdom. 
Countershading is a luminance gradient from a dark back to a light belly. We observe it in 
terrestrial diurnal mammals, birds, and reptiles, in amphibians, as well as in most fish 
species. The function of countershading is to camouflage the animal by counterbalancing 
the effects of self-shadowing. If the animal had a uniform coloration over its body 
surface, it would appear as a solid object with an attached shadow in the lower part of its 
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!  For instance, you are looking in the morning at a number of slightly darker, barely noticeable grease stains 3
on your white shirt. One of the dark patches is actually a shadow. 
body and a lighter, illuminated upper region of its body, hence easily identifiable by 
predators. By creating a coloration gradient that is opposite to this default coloration and 
luminance condition, Nature in effect has brought about a “fake shadow” on the upper 
region of the animals body, meant to conceal that surface. There is a counterexample to 
this “dark back and light belly” pattern in the class of fish, namely, one species of catfish, 
Synodontis nigriventris, which has a darker belly and lighter back. However, it is also 
known as the upside-down catfish, as it swims, unlike other fish species, upside-down, 
thus reaffirming the enormous selective pressure and advantage which lead to the 
emergence of countershading in the first place. 


IV 

Sorensen (2008: ch. 4) asks us to imagine the shadow cast by a spinning sphere. The 
sphere is spinning, but does its shadow spin too? Sorensen argues that it does. The reason 
is that the shadow is a causally derivative entity, entirely dependent on its caster; hence, it 
inherits the causally relevant properties of the caster, in this particular case its properties 
related to motion. The only reason we are hesitant in ascribing rotational motion to the 
shadow of the spinning sphere is that we do not see the shadow as moving. In order to 
persuade us of his view, Sorensen asks us to consider the case when the spinning sphere 
has a stick attached to it (2008: 82). Here, we seem to intuit that the shadow is indeed 
spinning, as the shadow of the stick is moving around the center of the sphere’s shadow. 
Now suppose the stick falls of at some point. It would be counterintuitive to say that all 
of a sudden, just because the stick fell off, the sphere’s shadow stopped spinning.  
 This intuition-pump is based on the compelling thought that we should maximize 
uniformity in judgment about some phenomenon, when the change in the setup of the 
mechanism that generates that phenomenon does not appear to be so drastic as to destroy 
it or radically change it. Uniformity in judgment, on the other hand, has to be based in the 
uniform application of some theory about the relevant phenomenon—in Sorensen’s 
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particular example, it is the Newtonian theory of motion as applied to shadows. However, 
Sorensen’s view that the shadow is spinning is not the only way to ensure such 
uniformity. If what I have been arguing for is correct, the apparent motion of shadows is, 
indeed, merely apparent, and the sought-after uniformity in theory at least, if not in 
judgment, is ensured by taking into account the behavior of such appearances. More to 
the point, motion of shadows is difference in location of the surface we fail to see 
properly. Speed is rate at which location of what we fail to see changes over time. Neither 
rotational, nor translational motion of shadows is real in the sense of being an objective 
property “out there”—it is a property of what, or rather where, we fail to see properly to a 
degree or other. However, apparent translational motion—which is the case of the 
attached stick’s shadow in Sorensen’s example—is indeed a case of a change of location 
of a surface we fail to see properly, and so unlike the rotational motion of a fixed disk or 
sphere. Hence, saying that the shadow has stopped moving when the stick fell off, though 
it does express a discontinuity in judgment, it does not amount to a discontinuity in 
theory. The uniform application of our theory requires a non-uniform judgment in this 
particular case.   4


V 

In the “disappearing act” puzzle, Sorensen (2008: ch. 3) asks us to visualize a completely 
black truncated cone brick which is a perfect imitation of the shadow cast by a conical 
object suspended below a lamp. We now slide the brick under the cone so that it exactly 
occupies the space where the shadow was/is located.  Here, we either see the shadow, in 
which case we totally fail to see the object, or we see the black object, in which case we 
properly see the black surface. However, since the brick does not absorb light (it is in 
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complete darkness), it must be the case, according to Sorensen, that what we see is the 
shadow.  
But there is no shadow, because it is not true that the object would reflect more 
light, were the blocker removed. We don't see the object either, because it does not absorb 
any light. We fail to see anything located at S, but pure darkness, hence, not all spatially 
delimited regions of darkness are shadows or black objects.  


VI 

In the “intersecting eclipses” riddle, Sorensen (2008: ch. 1) asks us to imagine looking at 
an eclipse that is the result of two planets, Far (farther from the observer) and Near 
(closer to the observer), lining up in the direction of the sunlight. One question is which 
of the two planets do we see, and Sorensen argues that it is Far, because it is the only of 
the two that is causally relevant in casting the shadow over the observer. However, 
Sorensen goes further and argues that when we see silhouettes, that is, backlit objects, 
what we see is the far ends of these, that is, the backs of these objects, because those are 
the surfaces that are causally relevant in blocking the light. This is an interesting view 
and the argument for it seems compelling. However, I think there is a better alternative. 
First, pace Jonathan Westphal (2011), silhouettes are not shadows, or front views 
of shadows. Consider you own silhouette in the mirror. You see both the apparent 
reflection of your silhouette (see below for details), and your shadow cast on the mirror. 
Now paint the portion of the mirror where the shadow is located black. Your shadow has 
been annihilated; no shadows on black surfaces. Yet, you still see your silhouette in the 
mirror.  
We see objects in the mirror indirectly, by seeing their image directly. This image 
is a reflection when the object that we see reflects light. When it doesn't, it is a 
parareflection (Sorensen 2008: ch. 6). Shadows and black objects in the mirror are such 
pararflections. However, silhouettes in the mirror are not even parareflections. The reason 
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is that seeing parareflections of shadows and black objects is still a form of indirectly 
seeing these particulars, but an apparent reflection of a silhouette does not qualify as 
indirectly seeing the silhouette. A photograph of a shadow presents to us an image of the 
shadow, which is not itself a shadow. A mirror parareflection of a shadow does the same 
thing as the photograph; it presents an image of the shadow. If the apparent reflection of 
the silhouette in the mirror were an indirect way to see the silhouette itself, it should not 
itself be a silhouette, but an image of it. But it is not an image.  
 To see this, note that the only reason one might think we see the silhouette 
indirectly through the mirror is that we see the light around it indirectly, because it is 
reflected by the mirror. But not all mirror reflections are images. The mirror reflection of 
an illuminated object is an image, but the reflection of light as such is not. When the Sun 
is reflected by a mirror, we see the sunlight itself, not an image of it. The same is true for 
any light source's mirror reflection; we see the light itself, not an image of it. Since the 
silhouette's ontology is determined by that of the light that surrounds it, the apparent 
reflection of the silhouette in the mirror is, therefore, not an image. It is the silhouette 
itself. But how can we see the silhouette in the mirror when in fact it is located on the 
opposite side, where the light blocker is located? The answer is that, just like in the 
previous case of Sorensen's disappearing act, we don't see something. The silhouette is 
pure darkness; whereas seeing a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface or a 
volume, seeing a silhouette is not even that much. A particular can't be in two or more 
places at the same time, and so we can't directly see one at a location while it objectively 
inhabits another. But we can fail to see one at such a location. Seeing a silhouette 
translates into a particular failure to see; it is ontologically dependent on seeing the light 
itself that is not blocked. As long as what we directly see at different locations, S1 ... Sn 
is the same particular quantity of light, our failure to see something at S1... Sn is the same 
particular failure. 
 One might object as follows. What we see in the mirror is a silhouette. However, 
it is not the silhouette. If it were, we would have a doubly located particular (one on each 
side of the object on the line connecting the light source and the specular space. So what 
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we see is another silhouette. But a silhouette according to the objector's own 
understanding, just like a shadow, is always the silhouette of a concrete object, whereas 
the silhouette that we are supposed to see in the mirror, if the objection works, is not; 
there are no concrete objects in specular space. 

VII 

In more recent work, Sorensen (2011: 206) mentions the phenomenon of amodal 
completion as adding further evidence to his view that by seeing silhouettes we see the 
backs of the blockers, and furthermore, that we even see the geometric structure of the 
interiors of those back surfaces.  

"Action in a silhouetted setting brings a conviction that one is seeing 
in a robust fashion. We prolong our basketball game past sundown 
because the silhouetted net has a discernible three-dimensional 
structure. From a long distance, you see well enough to side step an 
opponent, jump, aim and throw. The other players look up, see the ball 
sail across the lingering light of the sky, bounce against the backboard, 
teeter along the hoop, and then drop through the net. 
 As a supplement to the arguments in Seeing Dark Things, I now 
add an appeal to “amodal completion”. When a dog stands behind a 
picket fence, only segments of the dog are visible. Despite the 
occlusions, we see the dog as a whole object, not as a scattered sample 
of dog parts. The same holds when we see a silhouetted scene of a dog 
behind a fence." 

This appeal to amodal completion can be generalized and used as a further argument for 
the view that shadow perception is no different from object perception since they both 
share our visual system's tendency to amodally complete objectively disconnected parts 
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of the perceptual object. Amodal completion is the phenomenon by which our visual 
system groups disconnected parts of appearances in a way that matches the continuity of 
the concrete objects that cause our perception, although in terms of retinal stimulation 
these parts remain represented as discontinuous. Textbook examples include the dog 
behind a picket fence, which we perceive as a whole dog rather than as a collection of 
disconnected dog slices, or the dotted line pattern, which we perceive as a line rather than 
as a mere collection of disconnected line segments. 
 However, this further, amodal completion based potential rationale for taking 
shadow perception as a form  of and on a par with perception of ordinary objects is not 
very convincing once we realize that, in fact, amodal completion of shadows is not an 
autonomous phenomenon, but one that is parasitic on, or an offshot of, amodal 
completion in the perception of ordinary objects, and that it only occurs in cases when we 
perceive shadows with familiar shapes, that is, with shapes of ordinary objects. We 
amodally complete the dog's shadow just because its shape looks like that of a dog. If we 
consider randomly shaped superposed objects, it is far from clear that their shadows 
appear to us in a way in which we amodally complete each of them. Even the case of an 
interrupted simple, quasi-linear shadow, analogous to the dotted line in Gestalt 
psychology, it is not at all clear whether we amodally complete it so as to perceive it as 
one shadow. An example is the optical phenomenon phenomenon known as the shadow 
sausage, first described by Cyrus Adler (1967), which is an interrupted shadow cast by a 
stick having a part submerged in water and another above the water surface. Here is a 
description of the phenomenon in a more recent paper: 

"A curved meniscus of the water surface is formed in the vicinity of its 
attachment to the branch. Sunlight casts a shadow of the branch on the 
sediments at the bottom of the stream. Because of refraction at the curved 
meniscus, the shadow con- sists of two disjoint segments corresponding 
to the portions of the branch above and below the water surface. The end 
of each shadow segment is pointed. The two shadow segments were 
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named the shadow-sausage effect by the author of Ref. 1, since they 
resembled a pair of linked sausages." (Lock et al 2003, emphasis mine) 

As revealed by the emphasized passage, the reason this shadow consisting of two disjoint 
parts has been named a "shadow sausage" merely the resemblance to a connected sausage 
pair, so it is doubtful that we do actually perceive it as one shadow the way would 
perceive a sausage as one object. Hence, it looks as though amodal completion of shadow 
appearances is an exception rather than the rule.  

VIII 

Even though amodal completion of shadow appearances does not, as such, constitute a 
strong enough basis for the view that shadow perception is ultimately and basically no 
different from ordinary object perception, we do get a pretty strong indirect, empirically 
founded argument for the opposite view, which I have been propounding here, based on 
this phenomenon in the context of inquiring about the role shadow perception plays in the 
amodal completion of ordinary object appearances. We will see that the way shadow 
perception contributes to this is indicative of the likely truth of my view, namely, that 
seeing a shadow is a degree of failing to see a surface or a volume. 
 Tomonaga and Imura (2010) compared humans to chimpanzees in terms of the 
role played by shadows in their visual systems when it comes to amodal completion of 
appearances of shapes. The subjects were asked/trained to complete a search task in 
which they had to find the pacman figures (a disk with a missing quarter) from a set of 
distractors (disk and filled square shapes). Amodal completion occurs in both species 
when the pacman's appearance coincides with that of a disk partly occluded by a square. 
In these cases our visual system completes the pacman into a disk, hence, the search time 
for the pacman increases. As mentioned above, this phenomenon occurs in both humans 
and chimpanzees. However, when the pacman has an attached shadow along its square 
edge, such that the shadow appears as cast on the corresponding edge of the square 
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figure, humans and chimpanzees diverge in terms of search time needed to find the 
pacman: 

"All participants responded slowly under the occluded trials (without 
cast shadows) and rapidly under the control trials, replicating the 
previous results. The response times under the gap trials, however, 
varied between species and across conditions. The shadow cast by 
Pacman on the square prevented perceptual completion in humans but 
not in chimpanzees." (2010: 3) 

The way our visual system, unlike that of the chimpanzee, treats shadows indicates that it 
is "interested" in what lies underneath the shadow. In treating shadows as shadows rather 
than as black objects, our visual system automatically aims at something beyond the 
shadow itself, and which is obfuscated by the shadow. For the chimpanzee's visual 
system, on the other hand: 

"(...) the black area functioned as the other "object." If the black "object" 
were superimposed on Pacman in addition to the square, the results 
would have been the same as those obtained when this object was not 
presented. However, if the object were superimposed on the square, this 
object would have been integrated with the square, not with Pacman's 
shadow, and perceptual completion would have been achieved." (2010: 
5) 

This adds empirical evidence to our view that in perception shadows do not function as 
ordinary perceptual objects, which our visual system aims at, but rather as "veils" 
between us and what our visual system aims at, namely, the surface or volume obfuscated 
by the shadow.  
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